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ABSTRACT
A substantial part of households and micro enterprises, particularly in developing coun-
tries including Indonesia, did not have access to formal financial institutions which then
lead them to borrow money from illegal loan providers. Using an experimental study, we
tested whether predatory loan, an illegal short-term loan with high interest rate, was
preferable or not by comparing with pawnshop loan, bank loan and household’s limited
saving when households confront with financial distress. We divided the participants
into three groups: lower low, low, and upper low income. We found that predatory loan
was preferable especially for lower low and low income group. Result also confirmed
that even if the predatory loan charge was increased, the lower low- and low-income
groups still prefer to ease their financial distress through predatory loans. Moreover, the
longer the duration of the predatory loan, the higher its probability to be chosen as a
funding source in times of household financial distress.
ABSTRAK
Sebagian kelompok rumah tangga dan usaha mikro khususnya di negara-negara berkembang
termasuk Indonesia tidak memiliki akses ke lembaga-lembaga keuangan formal yang kemudian
meminjam uang di pemberi pinjaman yang illegal. Dengan menggunakan metode eksperimen,
kami menguji apakah pinjaman rentenir, suatu bentuk pinjaman jangka pendek yang illegal
dengan tingkat bunga yang sangat tinggi, lebih dipilih atau tidak dibandingkan dengan pegadaian,
pinjaman bank dan tabungan terbatas dari rumah tangga ketika suatu rumah tangga sedang
menghadapi kesulitan keuangan. Kami membagi partisipan menjadi 3 grup yaitu pendapatan
sangat rendah, rendah, di atas rendah. Kami menemukan bahwa pinjaman rentenir lebih dipilih
khususnya oleh kelompok pendapatan sangat rendah dan rendah. Hasil penelitian ini juga
mengkonfirmasi bahwa meskipun bunga pinjaman rentenir dinaikkan, kelompok pendapatan sangat
rendah dan rendah masih memilih untuk mengatasi kesulitan keuangan dengan pinjaman rentenir.
Lebih lanjut, semakin lama durasi dari pinjaman rentenir, semakin tinggi probabilitasnya untuk
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It has been widely known that a substantial part
of households and micro enterprises, particularly
in developing countries including Indonesia, does
not have access to formal financial institutions
which then lead them to borrow money from ille-
gal loan providers which is called predatory lend-
ers (Indonesian: rentenir). Karsidi et al. (2015)
analyze the determinants of households’ depen-
dency on predatory lenders by conducting a sur-
vey in a district in Indonesia. They explain that
households’ dependency on such loans could be
explained from the demand and supply side. On
the demand side, low level of financial literacy
constrains access of poor people to the formal fi-
nancial institutions. On the supply side, lending
to this part of society is risky and costly for banks.
Predatory lending could be generally de-
fined as a short term credit with limited amount
and high charge. This is slightly different with the
term “predatory lending” in some papers (e.g.
Bond et al., 2009; Agarwal et al., 2014). They ar-
gue that predatory lending exists when the lend-
ers encourage borrowers to put mortgages for
loans and due to they have private information,
the lenders know that borrower does not have
enough ability to repay the loans.
However, our predatory lending term here
is quite similar with the payday lending that has
been regulated in some U.S. states even though it
has become a debatable concept. Some papers, both
empirical and theoretical, have studied the exist-
ence and consequences of payday lending in the
US (e.g. Morse, 2011; Bhutta, 2014; Melzer & Mor-
gan, 2015; Desai & Elliehausen, 2017).
In this present paper, we examine the pref-
erability of predatory lending in Indonesia for
poor households when they encounter financial
problem. We construct within and between quasi-
experimental design to test whether a predatory
loan is preferable over a pawnshop loan, a bank
loan, and a household’s limited savings. We ar-
gue that a pawnshop loan is the direct and bal-
anced opponent of a predatory loan. In a pawn-
shop, people can obtain a loan provided they bring
some collateral that matches the amount of funds
needed based on the valuation of the pawnshop.
We divide the participants into 3 groups, lower
low, low, and upper low income. However, we
exclude the bank loan option for the lower low-
income group in the experiment because we ma-
nipulate this group to reflect a non-bankable or
credit-constrained status.
Going deeper we also look at the impact of
predatory loan charge (interest) and duration of
loan on the preferability of such loan by creating
within subject design and by measuring the sensi-
tivity level. Loan charge (interest rate) should be
considered to have an impact on how poor people
borrow money from predatory lenders even
though some might argue that borrowing people
are less sensitive to the changing in the charge of
this loan. However, as generally argued, we con-
sider that the more the charge on such loans, the
less preferable the loan to be chosen. Similarly,
we also look at the effect of loan duration on the
preferability of predatory loans. Arguably, the
longer the duration of loans, the more preferable
the loans should be.
Financial deepening and financial inclusion
have been a global initiative over the recent de-
cade including in Indonesia. Trinugroho et al.
(2015) find that there is a significant disparity in
financial deepening across provinces in Indonesia
which is resulted from different level of socio-eco-
nomic development and different level of business
environment. It also creates disparity in cost of
financial intermediation across regions (Trinugroho
& Wiwoho, 2016). Due to the limited access to
banking and other formal financial institutions, a
substantial number of poor people particularly in
the less developed regions rely on non-formal fi-
nancial institutions such as predatory lenders. Al-
though this kind of lender is illegal, it exists in
many areas in Indonesia both in rural and urban
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areas. In many cases, such loans do not require
formal collateral due to the lenders create a closer
lender-borrower relationship. It is suspected to be
an attractive point of this service even though the
interest rate is quite expensive.
As explained earlier, the concept of preda-
tory lending in Indonesia closes to the concept of
payday lending in the US. The difference is that in
the US, some states have regulated it. In the lit-
erature, basically, the proponents of the existence
of such lending argue that this industry provides
financing access to people who have no better al-
ternatives (Caskey, 2002). Morse (2011) explains
that in the one side, payday loans help distressed
people to overcome liquidity shock, in the oppo-
site side, however, payday loans might encour-
age people to over consume. Stegman & Faris (2003)
mention that such type of lending is acceptable in
the market due to the growing of demand and
providers are willing to supply it. Moreover, us-
ing data of payday loan industry in North Caro-
lina, they conclude that financial performance of
payday loan industry significantly increased. Some
other studies (e.g. Stegman, 2007; DeYoung &
Phillips, 2010) argue that the fees that lenders
charge for a payday loan should have a ceiling price
to reduce the potential predation of this loan.
To our knowledge, limited papers have dis-
cussed the role played by predatory lending in
the financial intermediary activities in the context
of Indonesia. An exception is the paper of Karsidi
et al. (2015) that conducting survey to more than
100 households in a region who borrow money
from predatory lenders. Basically, they argue that
dependency on predatory lending comes from the
demand and supply sides. However, the empiri-
cal results show that demand side significantly
affects the level of dependency.
METHODS
This study employs an experimental design
to examine our hypothesis. In an experiment in
the field of economics, participants make a deci-
sion in a controlled condition, which is designed
to measure the effect of a specific change or treat-
ments on the decision making (Engle-Warnick &
Laszlo, 2008). We construct a quasi-experimental
design to capture the decision of the participants
with regard to their preferred funding source in
some given conditions. We decide to use only male
participants because we want to perceive them as
heads of households as well as to control the mat-
ter of gender difference. A convenience sample of
60 male students, recruited from the Faculty of
Economics and Business, a university in Indone-
sia, was divided randomly into 3 balanced groups,
lower low, low and upper low income. We com-
bine within and between subject designs. The
within subject design is used to capture the re-
peated measurements within groups. The between
subject design is employed to test difference phe-
nomena between groups. Referring to Charness
& Gneezy (2009), we consider that incentives en-
courage the participants to seriously take part in
the experiment. The detailed procedures of the
experiment are shown in Table 1.
RESULTS
Table 2 shows the results of the baseline
measurement. In a given set of conditions, the
participants in each group choose their preferred
funding for an unexpected expense. We compare
the percentage difference in predatory loans be-
tween the 3 groups. The lower low-income group
has a higher predatory loan percentage than the
other groups. Its average predatory loan percent-
age is 50.83. This means that 50.83 percent of their
needed fund would be obtained from predatory
lending. The predatory loans percentage of low
and upper low-income are 41.5 and 32.5, respec-
tively. The F-test result shows that the predatory
loan percentages are not significantly different
between groups. In all the groups, the predatory
loan is the most preferred funding source.
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Step Description 
1 Constructing the conditions reflecting the three groups: lower low-income, low-income and upper low-
income. We divide the participants into these three groups due to our focus here is on poor households.  
? Lower low-income: The participants in this group are characterized as heads of households with income 
600,000 Rupiah per month (1 USD is currently equal to 13,300 Indonesian Rupiah). They have 1 million 
Rupiah in their saving account. There is an unexpected expense of 600,000 Rupiah that have to be paid in 
two days. They have a television which can be collateral of pawnshop loan. They have three options to pay 
the unexpected expense: use their saving account, borrow in predatory lender or borrow from pawnshop.  
? Low-income: The participants in this group are characterized as heads of households with income 1 million 
Rupiah per month. They have 2 million Rupiah in their saving account. There is an unexpected expense of 
1 million Rupiah that have to be paid in two days. They have a television and an ownership certificate of 
motorcycle which can be collateral of pawnshop loan. They have four options to pay the unexpected 
expense: use their saving account, borrow in predatory lender, borrow in pawnshop or borrow in bank.  
? Upper low-income: The participants in this group are characterized as a head of households with income 
1.5 million Rupiah per month. They have 3 million Rupiah in their saving account. There is an unexpected 
expense of 1.5 million Rupiah that have to be paid in two days. They have a television, an ownership 
certificate of motorcycle and a motorcycle which can be collateral of pawnshop loan. They have four 
options to pay the unexpected expense: use their saving account, borrow in predatory lender, borrow in 
pawnshop or borrow in bank.  
2 Constructing the baseline characteristics of the three funding options: predatory loan, pawn-shop loan and 
bank loan.  
? Predatory loan: The amount of the loan is 200,000 – 2 million Rupiah. The duration of the loan is 2 week. 
The charge for the loan is 10% which is equal to 20% per month. 
? Pawnshop loan: The maximum loan is 3 million Rupiah. The maximum duration is 36 month. Interest rate 
is 1% per month.  
? Bank loan: The annual interest rate is 13%. The minimum loan is 1 million Rupiah. 
3 Measuring baseline: The participants choose what kind and how much their preferred funding source.  
4 Measuring the predatory loan charge sensitivity (elasticity) 
? Treatment 1 (T1): The predatory loan charge is increased to 15%  
? Treatment 2 (T2): The predatory loan charge is increased to 20%  
5 Measuring the predatory loan duration sensitivity (elasticity)  
? Treatment 3 (T3): The predatory loan duration is extended to 3 weeks 
? Treatment 4 (T4): The predatory loan duration is extended to 4 weeks 
 
Table 1. Design of Experiment
Table 3 shows the results of treatments 1
and 2. In these treatments, the charge or fee for a
predatory loan is increased to 15 percent and 20
percent. Elasticity of predatory loan charge is mea-
sured using this formula: % change of average %
predatory loan divided by % change of predatory
loan charge. Figure I illustrates the predatory loan
charge elasticity. The within subject design com-
pares the differences preferred funding before and
after treatments 1 and 2. The F-tests for lower low
and low-income groups indicate that there is no
significant difference in the predatory loan per-
centage before and after the 2 treatments, how-
ever there is significant difference in the upper low-
income group. The result confirms that even if the
predatory loan charge is increased to 20 percent,
the lower low and low-income groups still prefer
to ease their financial distress through predatory
loans.
Table 4 presents the results of treatments 3
and 4. In these treatments, the duration of the
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predatory loan is extended to 3 weeks and 4
weeks, respectively. Figure II presents the preda-
tory loan duration elasticity. Elasticity of preda-
tory loan duration is measured using this formula:
% change of average % predatory loan divided
by % change of predatory loan duration.
Group Predatory Loan Pawnshop Loan Bank Loan 
 Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev 
Lower Low Income 50.83 39.17 25 35.25 X X 
Low Income 41.5 39.51 20.5 30.51 10 30.78 
Upper Low Income 32.5 38.42 15 26.98 30 43.12 
F-value for mean difference test 1.103  0.519  2.85*  
 Predatory Loan Pawnshop Loan Bank Loan 
 Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev 
Group 1: Lower Low Income       
Baseline 50.83  39.17 25 35.25 X X 
Treatment 1 45 43.29 23.33 33.51 X X 
Treatment 2 39.17 40.56 25.83 33.54 X X 
F-value for mean difference test 0.429  0.028    
Group 2: Low Income       
Baseline 41.5 39.51 20.5 30.51 10 30.78 
Treatment 1 32.5 33.69 23.5 31.33 10 30.78 
Treatment 2 25.5 34.86 23 34.81 15 36.63 
F-value for mean difference test 0.987  0.05  0.154  
Group 3: Upper Low Income       
Baseline 32.5 38.42 15 26.98 30 43.12 
Treatment 1 15.83 26.2 16.67 29.12 35 45.21 
Treatment 2 9.17 16.64 18.33 29.07 38.33 44.95 
F-value for mean difference test 
 
3.55**  0.069  0.178  
Table 2. Result of Baseline Measurement
This table presents the results of the baseline measurement. The participants choose the source of funding for their
unexpected expense in the baseline characteristics of the predatory loan. The lower low-income group does not have
access to bank loan. The value in this table is percentage of fund. The between subject design compares the percentage
of preferred funding between three groups. *, **, and *** indicate significance of difference at the 10 percent, 5 percent,
and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Table 3. Result of Predatory Loan Charge Sensitivity
This table presents the result of the treatments 1 and 2. In these treatments, the charge or fee of predatory loan is
increased to 15 percent and 20 percent. The lower low-income group does not have access to bank loan. The within subject
design compares the percentage of preferred funding within group before and after treatments. *, **, and *** indicate
significance of difference at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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The within subject design compares the dif-
ferences preferred funding before and after treat-
ments 3 and 4. The F-tests show that the preda-
tory loan percentage before and after the two
treatments is significantly different in the lower
low-income group but not significant in the low
and upper low-income groups. The results indi-
cate that the duration of the predatory loan is an
important factor in deciding to obtain a predatory
loan to ease financial distress. The longer the du-
ration of the predatory loan, the higher its prob-
ability to be chosen as a funding source in times of
individual financial distress.
 Predatory Loan Pawnshop Loan Bank Loan 
 Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev 
Group 1: Lower Low-Income       
Baseline 50.83  39.17 25 35.25 X X 
Treatment 3 58.33 36.47 20.83 31.47 X X 
Treatment 4 75 29.37 10.83 25.52 X X 
F-value for mean difference test 2.46*  1.103    
Group 2: Low-Income       
Baseline 41.5 39.51 20.5 30.51 10 30.78 
Treatment 3 49 42.04 15.5 29.28 10 30.78 
Treatment 4 60.5 41.61 10 26.16 10 30.78 
F-value for mean difference test 1.086  0.669  0.000  
Group 3: Upper Low-Income       
Baseline 32.5 38.42 15 26.98 30 43.12 
Treatment 3 39.17 40.92 13.33 26.82 26.67 42.71 
Treatment 4 48.33 42.2 9.17 25.06 25 40.28 
F-value for mean difference test 
 
0.769  0.261  0.073  
Table 4. Result of Predatory Loan Duration Sensitivity
This table presents the results of the treatments 3 and 4. In these treatments, the duration of predatory loan is longer to
3 weeks and 4 weeks. The lower low-income group does not have access to bank loan. The within subject design compares
the percentage of preferred funding within group before and after treatments. *, **, and *** indicate significance of
difference at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
 
Figure 1. Predatory Loan’s Charge Elasticity
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DISCUSSION
Our study clearly shows that predatory loan
is the main alternative of financing especially for
lower-low income households when they face un-
expected expense. The preferability of predatory
lending shown in our experimental study implies
that predatory lending is a main source of fund-
ing for credit-constrained households to mitigate
their financial distress. It is consistent with the
finding of Morse (2011), Gallmeyer & Roberts
(2009), and Karsidi et al. (2015) in which finan-
cially distressed households would prefer to bor-
row money from this lender to overcome finan-




Our experimental study obviously shows
that the predatory lending is preferable especially
for the lower low and low-income households
when unexpected expense create financial distress
to those households. It implies that regulator, in
the framework of financial inclusion, should miti-
gate this problem. Extending the access to formal
financial instructions for poor households should
be bolstered and diversified. Digital financial ser-
vices could be a tool for financial inclusion
(Trinugroho et al., 2017), however, it strongly
needs improved infrastructure and the level of fi-
nancial literacy should also be accelerated. More-
over, bolstering the role of Islamic banks to reach
the poor people is also strongly expected (Risfandy
et al., 2016).
Suggestions
With regards to the future studies in this
particular field, we suggest some directions. First,
it is suggested to test the preferability of preda-
tory loan on real households by using different
methods that are survey method and employing
secondary data. Extending the category of preda-
tory loan market by including micro enterprises
to prove that predatory lending is also used for
productive economic activities would be an inter-
esting as well.
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